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Retooling Sanctions: China’s Challenge to the Liberal
International Order
Timothy Webster*

Abstract
Professor Tom Ginsburg has produced yet another classic of transnational law, political
science, and international relations. Democracies and International Law yields important
insights into the democratic nature of international law but cautions that authoritarian states can
apply these very legal technologies for repressive or antidemocratic purposes. Building on
Ginsburg’s theories of mimicry and repurposing, this contribution highlights the role of both
techniques in the creation of China’s economic sanctions program. On the one hand, China has
developed a basic set of tools to impose economic sanctions—a key instrument in the liberal
international toolkit—on foreign entities and persons. In so doing, China has adopted elements
of American economic sanctions, as well as European directives, to blunt the force of foreign
sanctions. On the other hand, China has deployed sanctions for anti-democratic purposes,
including squelching free speech, freedom of thought, and academic inquiry. While a full discussion
of China’s sanctions regime (itself a project under construction) is still premature, the initial
imposition of sanctions suggests China is trying to accomplish very different aims than the liberal
states that pioneered economic sanctions in the twentieth century.

*

Professor of Law, Western New England University. My thanks to both Professor Ginsburg for
the invitation to participate in the conference, and the editors of the Chicago Journal of International
Law for their editorial assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Tom Ginsburg’s Democracies and International Law is an intellectual tour de force,
emphasis on tour.1 He begins in Gambia and ends in Fiji, surveying a broad sweep
of developments on national, regional, and global scales. Few studies—at least
those from a single author—cover Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australia, and
Europe with the same nimbleness, richness, empirical basis, and theoretical
sophistication.
Its geographical remit may be broad, but the book very much reflects the
current moment. On the one hand, democracy is backsliding across the world.
Brazil, India, and the United States (U.S.) have undergone sharp authoritarian
turns under Jair Bolsonaro, Narendra Modi, and Donald Trump, respectively.
Newer democracies—Indonesia, Hungary, Poland, Nicaragua, and Bangladesh—
have opted for more authoritarian modes of governance, whether by a single
person (Viktor Orbán, Sheikh Hasina), a single party (e.g., Poland’s Law and
Justice), or a combination of both. On the other hand, China, Russia, and other
authoritarian states are extending their influence both regionally and globally. This
can be profoundly destructive, as attested by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But it
is also potentially destabilizing. China is not just reshaping global geopolitics by
creating the world’s largest hub-and-spoke system—it is laying the foundations of
a new legal, political, and regulatory framework to govern trade, investment, and
diplomacy outside of the laws and norms that governed international relations for
the past seven decades.
As tensions rise between authoritarian states and liberal democracies, the use
of sanctions has assumed new prominence. This is nowhere more palpable than
in the mountain of sanctions that the West has imposed on Russia for illegally
invading another sovereign state. In this Essay, I use two concepts of Ginsburg’s
authoritarian legality—mimicry and repurposing—to explore the dynamics of this
transnational cycle of sanctions and countersanctions. Ginsburg writes, with
characteristic pith, “democracies innovate and authoritarians mimic and repurpose.”2 He
points to the examples of judges, elections, constitutions, and anti-corruption
commissions as institutions developed in the West and later redefined and
redeployed by authoritarian states. In this brief contribution, I show how another
institution of transnational governance—economic sanctions—fits this pattern of
investigation, translation, and repurposing.
Section II briefly traces the development of economic sanctions as an
economic weapon by liberal democracies to pressure foreign, often authoritarian,
states. Section III highlights China’s rudimentary sanctions regime and describes
the various models that China has mimicked in writing a new chapter of legal
1

TOM GINSBURG, DEMOCRACIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2021).

2

Id. at 193.
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development, international relations, and assertive diplomacy. Section IV explores
how China has repurposed economic sanctions, forging a tool once used to punish
government officials’ unsavory conduct and the corporations abetting that
conduct, into a weapon targeting anyone critical of China’s domestic or foreign
policy.

II. SANCTIONS
Economic sanctions emerged in the early twentieth century as an auxiliary
to war. Early commentators referred to the “economic weapon” as an “incidental
operation[ ] of war.”3 During the first world war, the United Kingdom (U.K.) and
the U.S. both passed laws entitled “Trading with the Enemy Act” to sanction
Germany4 and later expanded economic sanctions over the course of the
subsequent century.5 Other Western states adopted similar measures to restrict
economic relations during war or other periods of heightened tensions.
In time, economic sanctions decoupled from military conflict.
Contemporary research shows that human rights and democracy constitute the
primary aims of global sanctions, though war remains relevant.6 The emphasis on
values matters. As Nicholas Mulder recently argued, sanctions are “one of liberal
internationalism’s most enduring innovations of the twentieth century.”7 In light
of these origins, it is no surprise that Western states have imposed the majority of
economic sanctions and have targeted primarily African and Asian nations.8
The U.S. has imposed sanctions on the People’s Republic of China since its
inception in 1949.9 The severity of these sanctions has varied, but the last several
years (2018–2022) represent the peak of American sanctions against China. The
broader U.S.-China relationship has also changed. Under the increasingly
authoritarian grip of Chinese president Xi Jinping, the Trump administration took
a more punitive approach to China, an approach broadly adopted by the Biden
3

4

5

6

7
8
9

Anton Bertram, The Economic Weapon as a Form of Peaceful Pressure, 17 TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC’Y
139, 141 (1931).
Trading with the Enemy Act 1914 c.89 (UK) (repealed 1939), https://perma.cc/EQ9T-V63C;
Trading with the Enemy Act, Pub. L. No. 65-91, 40 Stat. 411 (1917).
See, e.g., Jackson-Vanik Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2432 (1975); Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 104172, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996); United Nations Act 1946 c.45 (UK), https://perma.cc/B99A-LQX9;
Terrorist Asset Freezing Act 2010 c.38 (UK), https://perma.cc/NLS9-P4NB; Sanctions and
Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 c.13 (UK), https://perma.cc/A36C-NCV5.
See Gabriel Felbermayr, Aleksandra Kirilakha, Constantinos Syropoulos, Erdal Yalcin & Yoto V.
Yotov, The Global Sanctions Data Base 45 (Drexel Univ., Working Paper No. 2, 2020).
NICHOLAS MULDER, THE ECONOMIC WEAPON 3 (2021).
See Felbermayr, supra note 6, at 60–61.
See Xin-zhu J. Chen, China and the US Trade Embargo, 1950-1972, 13 AM. J. CHINESE STUD. 169, 169
(2006) (noting U.S. export restrictions of strategic materials to China and a total trade embargo after
China entered the Korean War in 1950).
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administration.10 Indeed, specific laws targeting China have also piled up, attested
by the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (2019),11 the Hong Kong
Autonomy Act (2020),12 and the Xinjiang Forced Labor Act (2021).13 Under these
and other laws, the U.S. has sanctioned dozens of Chinese and Hong Kong
officials such as Carrie Lam (Hong Kong’s chief executive) and Wang Chen
(Chinese Communist Party politburo member).14 To date, however, the U.S. has
not targeted anybody within the top leadership of China.

III. CHINA’S SANCTIONS REGIME: AN OVERVIEW
At present, China’s sanctions regime is rudimentary and primarily defensive
in nature. While a more offensive deployment of sanctions is already visible, China
began its sanctions program in response to proliferating American sanctions, bans,
and other trade tensions. This Section highlights the main elements of China’s
inchoate sanctions program, paying particular attention to the American and
European models on which China based its program.
China’s erection of a sanctions regime is not mere mimicry, however. As
with any legal transplant, China deploys sanctions in ways that both mirror
Western practices and deviate from them. China has imposed sanctions on

10

11
12
13
14

The Trump administration deployed a variety of tactics in its trade war against China, including
blocking popular Chinese internet companies like TikTok and WeChat, and arranging for the house
detention of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou in Canada. The trade war, of course, resulted from the
imposition of tariffs on various theories. See generally Thomas J. Schoenbaum & Daniel C.K. Chow,
The Perils of Economic Nationalism and a Proposed Pathway to Trade Harmony, 30 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.
115 (2019).
Pub. L. No. 116-76, 113 Stat. 1161 (2019).
Pub. L. No. 116-141, 134 Stat. 663 (2020).
Pub. L. No. 117-78, 135 Stat. 1525 (2021).
In August 2020, the U.S. “Treasury imposed sanctions on eleven individuals for undermining Hong
Kong’s autonomy and restricting the freedom of expression or assembly of the citizens of Hong
Kong.” See Press Release: Treasury Sanctions Individuals for Undermining Hong Kong’s Autonomy, U.S. DEP’T
TREASURY (Aug. 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/4JC9-KJZM (noting sanctions imposed inter alia on
Carrie Law, pursuant to the Hong Kong Human Rights Act of 2019, and Hong Kong Autonomy
Act of 2020). In October 2020, the U.S. sanctioned twenty-four additional persons, pursuant the
Hong Kong Accountability Act, including politburo member, Wang Chen. See Update to Report on
Identification of Foreign Persons Involved in the Erosion of the Obligations of China Under the Joint Declaration
or the Basic Law, U.S. DEP’T STATE (Mar. 16, 2021), https://perma.cc/U3D4-2F5Z.
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high-level political figures in the U.S.,15 Canada,16 and the European Union
(E.U.)17 in tit-for-tat exchanges. But China has also repurposed sanctions to attack
scholars, experts, and critics of China. In this way, the economic weapon of liberal
internationalism has been repurposed to blunt criticism of China, often by
well-informed and exhaustively sourced reporting. To put the matter plainly,
China is using its sanctions regime for authoritarian purposes: to deflect charges
of China’s human rights abuses against its own citizens, to cast doubt on foreign
critics of China, and to chill inquiry into topics that portray China in a negative
light.

A. Unreliable Entity List
To date, China’s sanctions program has three planks. China first announced
its foreign sanctions policy in May 2019. Citing an international environment of
“economic uncertainty, increased instability, unilateralism, rising protectionism,
and severe challenges facing the multilateral trading system,” the Ministry of
Commerce revealed its hand.18 The ministry would henceforth compile an
“Unreliable Entity List”19 (UEL) of foreign persons, corporations, and legal
persons that acted against China’s national interests. In an ironic twist, given the
Trump administration’s naked attempts to squelch the World Trade Organization
(WTO) and strangle other multilateral institutions, China became a loud
proponent, though not necessarily a firm adherent, to the market-based
15

16

17

18

19

On the day that Biden was sworn in as U.S. President, China announced sanctions on twenty-eight
officials and advisors from the Trump administration, including Mike Pompeo, Steven Bannon,
John Bolton, Peter Navarro, Matthew Pottinger, and Alex Azar. See Amanda Macais, China Sanctions
Pompeo, O’Brien, Azar and Other Trump Administration Officials after Biden Inauguration, CNBC (Jan. 20,
2021), https://perma.cc/ZU9N-KKG8. China later sanctioned Gayle Manchin (chair of U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom), and Tony Perkins (vice-chair of U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom), for the commission’s criticism of Xinjiang.
Associated Press, Blinken Condemns China Sanctions on U.S. Officials, POLITICO (Mar. 27, 2021),
https://perma.cc/C6MY-SRJT.
China sanctioned Michael Chong, a conservative member of parliament (MP). See China Announces
Sanctions on Canadians, Including MP Michael Chong, CBC (Mar. 27, 2021), https://perma.cc/62K2QD9Z.
China placed sanctions on ten European citizens, including five members of the European
Parliament, and legislators from Belgium, Lithuania, and the Netherlands. China also sanctioned
two scholars critical of concentration camps in Xinjiang: Adrian Zenz (Germany) and Bjorn Jerden
(Sweden). See China Hits Back at EU with Sanctions on 10 People, Four Entities Over Xinjiang, REUTERS
(Mar. 22, 2021), https://perma.cc/G8M8-UDEJ.
Shangwubu: Zhongguo jiang jianli bukekao shiti qingdan zhidu [Ministry of Commerce: China Will
Establish a System of Unreliable Entities], MINISTRY COM. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC CHINA (May 31,
2019), https://perma.cc/2VTP-T6KU [hereinafter China Establishes System]
Ministry of Commerce, Order No. 4: Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List (Sept. 19, 2020)
(hereinafter Unreliable Entity List). An English translation is available at https://perma.cc/G5PKKXW7.
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multilateral trading system. The ministry would henceforth list entities that “do
not comply with market regulations, deviate from the spirit of contract, or
blockade or sever supplies to Chinese entities for non-commercial purposes.”20
China issued the UEL in September 2020. As a result, China can now
designate a person, legal entity, or company as “unreliable” in one of two
situations: the entity (a) endangers “national sovereignty, security or development
interests of China;” or (b) suspends “normal transactions with,” or “appl[ies]
discriminatory measures against, a [Chinese entity]” in violation of “normal
market transaction principles.”21 The remit of the first prong is potentially
boundless, reaching a broad sweep of conduct that might well be tolerated in
liberal democracies, such as state criticism by educational institutions, social
media, journalists, non-governmental organizations, or other sectors.22 But the
second prong better explains the system’s raison d’être: to prevent foreign
companies from severing trade with Chinese entities in order to further Western
sanctions.23
Punishments for unreliable entities include restrictions on trading and
investing in China, visa denials, revocation of work permits or residency rights in
China, fines, and “other necessary measures.”24 But the regulation also envisions
a soft touch, providing a grace period during which foreign entities can “rectify”
their conduct to avoid the list,25 a special license by which Chinese entities can
seek items from sanctioned foreign entities,26 and a process to remove one’s name
from the list.27
The UEL will seem familiar to anyone acquainted with U.S. sanctions. In the
U.S., the sprawling sanctions regime spans decades, government departments
(Commerce, Treasury, State), target countries, and sectors (nuclear, technology,
etc.). The two features most germane to the present discussion involve sanctions
on foreign individuals (travel bans, asset freezes), and export controls.

20
21
22

China Establishes System, supra note 18.
Unreliable Entity List, supra note 19, art. 2.
Lester Ross, Kenneth Zhou & Tingting Liu, China’s MOFCOM Promulgated the Provisions on the
Unreliable Entities List, WILMERHALE (Sept. 22, 2020), https://perma.cc/B52A-567L.

26

Wang Feng & Dai Menghao, Four Key Issues on China’s Unreliable Entity List, CHINA L. INSIGHT (Oct.
16, 2020), https://perma.cc/92YH-MZ6Z. The authors, attorneys with King and Wood Mallesons,
emphasize the regulation’s “anti-boycotting” nature—to prohibit companies from complying with
another country’s sanctions regime. Id.
Unreliable Entity List, supra note 19, art. 10.
Id. art. 9.
Id. art. 12.

27

Id. art. 13.

23

24
25
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Pursuant to various pieces of legislation, the U.S. Treasury Department
keeps a list of “specially designated nationals,”28 consisting of entities or
individuals. Once so designated, these legal and natural persons face a number of
potential penalties: they may be prevented from transacting business with U.S.
entities, have their assets frozen in the U.S., or be banned from traveling to the
U.S. Towards the end of the Trump administration, the Treasury Department
named fourteen Chinese officials to the “Specially Designated Nationals List,” all
members of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (China’s highest
legislative body).29 In explaining these designations, the State Department claimed
that the fourteen officials “effectively neutered the ability of the people of Hong
Kong to choose their elected representatives” by enacting the National Security
Law.30 Henceforth, these Chinese officials would face visa restrictions, their U.S.based assets would be frozen, and they—as well as their immediate family
members—would be barred from entering the U.S.31 Within the U.S., the move
was seen as a way to pressure the incoming Biden administration to take a tough
stance on China. Within China, foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying
condemned “the outrageous, unscrupulous, crazy and vile act of the U.S. side,”
and accused the U.S. of violating “basic norms governing international
relations.”32
The second feature includes export controls, a vast regulatory apparatus that
limits American entities from exporting certain items to designated foreign
businesses, entities, or persons. The Commerce Department maintains three lists
that U.S. exporters must consult before exporting covered products, lest the
exporter run afoul of U.S. export controls. Of particular importance to the
Chinese sanctions program is the U.S. Entity List, which names thousands of
foreign parties banned from receiving items from American exporters.33
The U.S. Entity List includes any “foreign party, such as an individual,
business, research institution, or government organization” engaged in activities

28

29

30

31
32

33

See, e.g., International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1708 (1977); the Global
Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2656 (2016); the Hong Kong
Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 116-149, 134 Stat. 663 (2020).
Hong Kong-Related Designations: Specially Designated Nationals List Update, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Dec.
7, 2020), https://perma.cc/8NKK-W54Y.
Press Statement: Designation of National People’s Congress Officials Undermining the Autonomy of Hong Kong,
U.S. DEP’T STATE (Dec. 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/VE93-WST2.
Id.
Shannon Tiezzi, ‘Crazy and Vile:’ China Reacts with Fury to US Sanctions on Top Legislators, DIPLOMAT
(Dec. 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/PCY7-K7K4.
The other two lists include the Denied Persons List, which targets American parties that have been
stripped of export privileges, and the Unverified List, a “list of parties whose bona fides [the
Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security] has been unable to verify.” See generally
Lists of Parties of Concern, U.S. DEP’T COM., BUREAU INDUS. & SEC., https://perma.cc/6GJB-CKYY.
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contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests.34 In practice, this
means that a designated foreign party cannot receive controlled items from U.S.
entities without a license.35 The U.S. imposes administrative sanctions (e.g.,
temporary or permanent denial of export privileges, compliance audits), civil fines,
and even criminal sanctions on those who violate U.S. export controls.36 Sanctions
have recently included prison sentences, probation, and community service for
natural persons; and criminal fines, civil fines, and denial of export privileges for
both natural and legal persons.37 Take the prominent example of Chinese
telecommunications company, ZTE. It sent routers, microprocessors, and servers
to Iran in defiance of U.S. sanctions on the Islamic Republic.38 ZTE would
ultimately pay a combined civil and criminal penalty of $1.19 billion—the largest
fine ever levied for export controls on a company.39 The Chinese firm would also
face extensive audit and compliance requirements in the future and denial of
export privileges from the U.S.40
In response to the U.S., China created its own “Unreliable Entity List.”41 At
present, two years after issuing the regulation, China has not yet listed a single
person or entity. That does not mean, however, that the Unreliable Entity List has
had no effect. On the day that the Ministry of Commerce issued the guidelines,
Global Times—the sharpest-tongued of China’s state media entities—intimated
that China would sanction the British bank HSBC for its “collusion with the US
to frame Chinese tech giant Huawei.”42 While HSBC was already under
investigation in the U.K., its possible punishment by China was linked to the drop
to a 25-year low of the bank’s share price.43 A similar fate befell FedEx after China

37

Lists of Parties of Concern, supra note 33.
Id.
The Bank of International Settlements published a list of persons sanctioned by U.S. export control
laws. They include an American citizen, Ron Hansen, who smuggled forensic hardware and
software into China and received a sentence of ten years in federal prison. U.S. DEP’T OF COM.,
BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., DON’T LET THIS HAPPEN TO YOU! ACTUAL INVESTIGATIONS OF
EXPORT CONTROLS AND ANTIBOYCOTT VIOLATIONS 47–48 (2020), https://perma.cc/ZK3G4WT5.
Id. at 37–56

38

Id. at 48–49.

39

Id.
Id.
See Yuanyou Yang, China Implements its Long-Awaited Unreliable Entities List Mechanism, CHINA BUS.
REV. (Oct. 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/MS25-ZKZN.
See Li Qiaoyi, HSBC Shares Sink on Scandal Report, GLOB. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2020),
https://perma.cc/8C2Z-A36N.

34
35
36

40
41

42

43

Narayanan Somasundaram, HSBC Shares Hit 25-Year Low on Reported ‘Unreliable List’ Inclusion,
NIKKEI ASIA (Sept. 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/BTC2-L8XF.
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announced it would investigate the logistics company for diverting packages away
from Huawei, to further American sanctions on the tech giant.44
In the end, China sanctioned neither HSBC nor FedEx. But the coordination
between the Ministry of Commerce and Global Times should give pause to
multinational enterprises. As Angela Zhang argues, this is part of a Chinese
strategy “to use the minimal threat possible to achieve the purpose of
deterrence.”45 Given its economic heft, China need not actually use tools of
economic coercion; the mere threat may suffice to send signals to foreign
enterprises.

B. Blocking Measures
The second plank of China’s economic sanctions is the January 2021
Blocking Measures.46 Passed amidst a wave of U.S. sanctions,47 the Blocking
Measures aim to neutralize the effects of foreign sanctions on Chinese companies.
Noting that extraterritorial sanctions violate international law, the measures
mandate that (Chinese) persons affected by foreign (Western) sanctions report
them to Chinese state authorities.48 The measures envision a “working
mechanism” to counteract “unjustified extra-territorial application of foreign
legislation and other measures.”49 The mechanism will determine whether the
foreign sanctions are “unjustified” by weighting such factors as whether they
violate international law, harm China’s “national sovereignty” or “development
interests,” or impact rights and interests of China’s citizens or legal persons. 50
Upon deeming the sanctions unjustified, members of the mechanism will issue
prohibition orders (to nullify the legal effect of foreign sanctions),51 allow affected
Chinese persons (legal or natural) to sue in Chinese courts,52 and advise Chinese
persons on how to respond to foreign sanctions.53 Finally, the measures allow
44

45

46

Connor Smith, FedEx Stock Is Slipping as China Investigates Diverted Huawei Deliveries, BARRON’S (June
3, 2019), https://perma.cc/3NRS-HFU8. While the unreliable entity list came out in 2020, the
Chinese government announced it would release such a list in May 2019.
ANGELA HUYUE ZHANG, CHINESE ANTITRUST EXCEPTIONALISM: HOW THE RISE OF CHINA
CHALLENGES GLOBAL REGULATION, 228–29 (2020).
Order No. 1: Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other
Measures, MINISTRY COM. (Jan. 9, 2021) [hereinafter Blocking Measures]. An English translation is
available at https://perma.cc/2RYT-Q5Y5.

52

The difference between the international environment should not escape us. In 1996, the U.S.
targeted Iran, Libya, and Cuba, not the E.U. In 2020, the U.S. was targeting China.
Blocking Measures, supra note 46, art. 5.
Id. art. 4.
Id. art. 6.
Id. art. 7.
Id. art. 8.

53

Id. art. 10.

47

48
49
50
51
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Chinese government departments to support Chinese citizens who suffer
“significant losses resulting from non-compliance” with foreign sanctions.54
As with the Unreliable Entity List, China looked to the West for source
material, borrowing heavily from the E.U.’s Blocking Statute. In 1996, the E.U.
passed a directive to nullify the extraterritorial effects of U.S. sanctions on Iran,
Libya, and Cuba.55 Since American sanctions were global in their scope, they
applied to European actors that conducted business with Cuban or Iranian
entities, even if there were no direct nexus to the U.S. In brief, the E.U. (a) requires
any person affected by foreign sanctions to report them to the Commission,56 (b)
refuses to recognize or enforce judgments that give effect to foreign sanctions in
E.U. courts,57 (c) prohibits persons from complying with requirements or
prohibitions promulgated by foreign sanctions,58 and (d) permits affected parties
to recover damages, including legal costs, sustained by foreign sanctions. 59 In
2021, the European Court of Justice clarified the scope of the Blocking Statute,
holding that E.U. citizens are prohibited from complying with U.S. sanctions that
require the termination of contracts with Iranian businesses.60 The court further
held that U.S. sanctions, by virtue of their extraterritorial effect, violate
international law.61
China’s measures borrow various features from the European model,
including the reporting requirement, private right of action, and exemption
process.62 But a few differences are worth noting. First, the E.U. statute specifies
the foreign laws to which it applies, clarifying the scope of sanctions for concerned
European businesses. China’s measures, by comparison, impose no such
limitations, perhaps due to the broadening array of international sanctions that
diverse jurisdictions—including Canada and the U.K.—currently impose on
China.
Second, the Chinese government maintains greater control over the
implementation of the blocking measures. The E.U. statute applies directly to
54
55

56
57
58
59
60

61
62

Blocking Measures, supra note 46, art. 11.
See Council Regulation No. 2271/96, Protecting Against the Effects of the Extra-territorial
Application of Legislation Adopted by a Third Country, and Actions Based Thereon or Resulting
Therefrom, 1996 O.J. (L 309) 1 (EC). The E.U. passed the law in response to American sanctions
legislation directed at Iran, Libya, and Cuba, as noted in the directive’s annex.
Id. art. 2.
Id. art. 4.
Id. art. 5.
Id. art. 6.
Case C-124/20, Bank Melli Iran v. Telekom Deutschland GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2021:1035, ¶¶ 42–
51 (Dec. 21, 2021).
See id. ¶ 3.
See China’s ‘Blocking Statute’ – New Chinese Rules to Counter the Application of Extraterritorial Foreign Laws,
GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 13, 2021), https://perma.cc/FK32-7J4Q.
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individuals within the E.U., without need for permission from national or
supranational authorities.63 China, by contrast, requires the formation of a
“working mechanism,” first to decide whether the sanctions are “justified,” and
second to determine an appropriate course of action. This reflects China’s desire
to control each step of the countersanctions process, whereas the E.U. seems to
place responsibility for enforcement on affected individuals or companies. The
authoritarian impulse to centralize power overrides the possibility of enabling
individuals to act on their own initiative.
To date, China has provided little additional guidance on the implementation
of the blocking measures. Even now, basic questions—How will Chinese authorities
constitute the working mechanism? How do Chinese citizens qualify?—linger. In the two
reported cases this author has been able to find, Chinese judges refused to apply
the blocking measures, apparently with good reason.64 At this point, it would be
premature to draw conclusions about China’s implementation of its blocking
measures. One suspects, however, that China will tread carefully where significant
amounts of foreign investment might be at stake.

C. Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law
The third plank of China’s sanctions regime is the Anti-Foreign Sanctions
Law (Sanctions Law), the first national-level legislation issued in the field.65
According to the National People’s Council (NPC), which enacted the statute, the
law fulfills “an urgent necessity in order to counter the hegemonism and power
politics of some Western countries.”66 The NPC further characterized the law as
63

64

65

66

For example, the E.U. statute uses language such as “no judgment . . . shall be recognized” and “no
person . . . shall comply . . . with any requirement of prohibition.” Council Regulation No. 2271/96,
supra note 55, arts. 4, 5. The implication is that no authorization from an E.U. entity is needed; the
foreign sanction itself has no legal effect.
See Ren Qing et al., Zhongguo Chukou Guanzhi he Zhicai Niandu Huigu yu Zhanwang [Annual
Review and Outlook on China’s Export Controls and Sanctions] (Jan. 27, 2022),
https://perma.cc/2GJJ-QAKW. The author is a Chinese lawyer with the Global Law Office. In
the first case, a Chinese company sought to prevent the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award,
but the Shanghai court found that the blocking measures would not apply to a lawfully rendered
arbitral award. Accord Sun Jiajia & Xiao Yudan, “Zuduan Banfa” Neng Fou “Zuduan” Waiguo
Zhongcai Caijuede Chengren he/huo Zhixing? Cong Shouli ni “Zuduan” Chengren he Zhixing
Xinjiapo Zhongcai Caijue’an Shouqi [Can the “Blocking Measures” “Block” the Recognition
and/or Enforcement of a Foreign Arbitral Award, Starting From the First Case to “Block” the
Recognition and Enforcement of a Singapore Arbitral Award] (Dec. 29, 2021),
https://perma.cc/TB46-ZPC9. In the second case, the Chinese court decided that the putatively
sanctioned company, a Russian Bank that conducted business with North Korea, did not appear
on the Treasury Department’s entity list, likewise rendering the blocking measures inapt.
Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Fanwaiguo Zhicaifa [Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law of the People’s
Republic of China] (2021), https://perma.cc/GP59-8SMW [hereinafter Sanctions Law].
Anti-foreign Sanctions Law Necessary to Fight Hegemonism, Power Politics: Official, NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG.
(June 10, 2021), https://perma.cc/VGX8-87JU.
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a counterweight to the imposition of “so-called sanctions upon related state
organs, organizations and public servants by using pretexts including Xinjiang,
Tibet and Hong Kong-related issues.”67 It is important to stress that the Sanctions
Law opposes sanctions imposed by foreign jurisdictions; it is not “anti-foreign”
in the xenophobic sense, as one might glean from the English translation of the
law.
The Sanctions Law builds upon the two measures discussed above. For
instance, the Sanctions Law includes the same techniques for designating parties
as the Unreliable Entity List, and the Blocking Measures.68 Likewise, the
punishments under the Sanctions Law mirror those from the Unreliable Entity
List: visa denials, asset freezes, restrictions or prohibitions on trade with Chinese
entities, and the catch-all “other necessary measures.”69 But the Sanctions Law
also expands upon the prior regulations by broadening potential targets to include
“spouses and family members of individuals included on the list,” senior managers
of corporate entities included on the list, and organizations where listed
individuals serve as senior managers.70 Punishing family members is common in
other sanctions regimes, including that of the U.S. But it still represents an
escalation within China’s own system.

IV. APPLICATION OF CHINA’S SANCTIONS
China’s sanctions edifice was, in many ways, a reaction to the imposition of
sanctions by Western countries, the U.S. chief among them. Moreover, China has
used many of the same techniques, mechanisms, and punishments devised by
North American and European sanctions programs. Though still incipient,
China’s sanctions program shows a few discernible trends. As Professor Ginsburg
would predict, China’s applications diverge from the liberal principles that
animated Western sanctions and reveal a distinctively authoritarian spirit. Indeed,
it is no surprise that China is experimenting in a field where the divide between
public and private is somewhat porous, where China can “slip back and forth
across roles depending on the urgency and important of the issue.”71
Two points in particular are worth noting. First, China’s sanctions are
reactive. In 2020, the U.S. sanctioned four high-ranking Chinese officials for their
67
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The Sanctions Law and Unreliable Entity List both target foreign entities that apply “discriminatory
measures against Chinese individuals, enterprises or other organizations.” Sanctions Law, supra note
65, art. 4; Unreliable Entity List, supra note 19, art. 2(2). The Sanctions Law and Blocking Measures
both respond to situations where foreign countries apply sanctions that “violate international law
and basic principles of international relations.” Sanctions Law, supra note 65, art. 4; Blocking
Measures, supra note 46, art. 2.
Sanctions Law, supra note 66, art. 6; Unreliable Entity List, supra note 19, art. 10.
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roles in creating detention camps for Uighurs in Xinjiang. Four days later, China
imposed sanctions on high-ranking U.S. officials (Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio, and
Chris Smith) as well as individuals working in federal agencies (and the director of
Human Rights Watch) who have criticized China’s treatment of Uyghurs.72 Such
tit-for-tat sanctions recall the mimicry at the heart of authoritarian appropriation
of liberal international ideals.
Second, and more concerning to liberal internationalists, China has
repurposed sanctions to bludgeon foreign critics of China. This is a worrisome
development for the global community of observers, academics, and experts on
China, many of whose criticisms of China are supported by empirical,
documentary, or anecdotal evidence. In February 2021, China sanctioned ten
British nationals: mostly politicians, but also one lawyer (discussed here) and one
academic (discussed below). The lawyer, Geoffrey Nice,73 currently leads an
independent tribunal investigating atrocities committed against Uyghur, Kazakh,
and Turkic citizens of the People’s Republic.74 China has long bristled at Western
criticisms of its treatment of Muslim minorities, an issue that flared up after the
American allegation of genocide. By sanctioning a person who leads an
independent civil society organization tasked with investigating human rights
abuses, China is reforging a tool of liberal internationalism into a weapon of
authoritarian intolerance, revealing disdain for independent inquiry, freedom of
speech, and freedom of thought. Targeting Geoffrey Nice can also be seen as a
crackdown on civil society, an essential element of liberal democracy. China has
long suppressed human rights defenders, lawyers, and independent nongovernmental organizations within its own borders. But in suppressing foreign
critics, China is replicating its own authoritarian logic on the world stage.
China has also used its inchoate sanctions program to silence foreign critics,
both prominent and obscure. Among the more prominent persons targeted by
Chinese sanctions are Sophie Richardson of Human Rights Watch (HRW), and
Adrian Zenz, a German anthropologist. Richardson has worked at HRW since
2006, authoring dozens of reports and commentaries on China’s domestic and
foreign policy. China did not specify the reasons for sanctioning Richardson,
though it does not seem that her (relatively sparse) work on Xinjiang embroiled
her in sanctions. Richardson was one of many contributors to a 2021 HRW report
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See China Sanctions 11 US Politicians, Heads of Organizations, ABC (Aug. 10, 2020),
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on Xinjiang, yet was the only person sanctioned.75 Instead, the sanctions seem like
more of a “lifetime achievement” award for an extended period of criticism, and
perhaps a broader reproach to human rights more generally.
Adrian Zenz, by comparison, has taken a narrower—but more trenchant—
tack by exposing China’s abuse of Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. He has
methodically documented China’s campaign, using government documents to
show, inter alia, that China has forcibly sterilized thousands of Uyghur women and
coercively inserted intrauterine devices into thousands more.76 He has also shown
that China has detained male Uyghurs for having too many children.77 Zenz’s
research grounded the U.S. government’s claim that China committed genocide
against the Uyghurs. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo first leveled the
genocidal accusation on the last day of the Trump administration.78 The Biden
team retained that Trump-era policy, as it has elsewhere.79 Needless to say, this
allegation likely motivated Chinese sanctions on Zenz.
China also targets lower-profile academics.80 As part of the British sanctions
noted above, China added Professor Jo Smith Finley of Newcastle University to
the list.81 Professor Finley has published dozens of articles about Xinjiang, Uyghur
identity, and Chinese Islam; several recent articles characterize China’s treatment
of Uyghurs as genocide.82 Sanctioning Professor Finley replicates on a global scale
the internal repression that the People’s Republic of China already directs at
Chinese academics who criticize or oppose government policy.83
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See “Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots:” China’s Crimes Against Humanity Targeting Uyghurs and Other
Turkic Muslims, HUM. RTS. WATCH (April 19, 2021), https://perma.cc/F5Y3-EKZS. Contributors
to this report on Xinjiang include Beth Van Schaack (professor at Stanford Law School), Maya
Wang (HRW), Brad Adams (HRW), and Sophie Richardson, yet only Richardson was formally
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See Adrian Zenz, China’s Own Documents Show Potentially Genocidal Sterilization Plans in Xinjiang,
FOREIGN POL’Y (July 1, 2020), https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/07/01/china-documents-uighurgenocidal-sterilization-xinjiang/.
See id.
See Humeyra Pamuk & David Brunnstrom, In Parting Shot, Trump Administration Accuses China of
‘Genocide’ against Uighurs, REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2021), https://perma.cc/5YFF-RTPE.
See John Hudson, As Tensions with China Grow, Biden Administration Formalizes Genocide Claim Against
Beijing, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2021), https://perma.cc/7KCG-QY9Y.
China has simultaneously clamped down on Chinese academics looking to participate in academic
conferences and exchanges with Western institutions. See Emily Feng, China Tightens Restrictions and
Bars Scholars from International Conferences, NPR (Mar. 30, 2022), https://perma.cc/NCY5-J7ZN.
See Wintour, supra note 74.
Her webpage at Newcastle University lists dozens of publications, several of which accuse China
of committing genocide against Uyghurs and other minorities. See Staff Profile: Dr Jo Smith Finley,
NEWCASTLE UNIV., https://perma.cc/5NWY-VH23.
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China has also sanctioned mild critics. A Swedish researcher, Björn Jerdén,
published a handful of pieces critical of China,84 though nothing particularly
scathing or relevant to Xinjiang. But he was included as part of a broader package
of sanctions that China directed at European citizens after the E.U. sanctioned
China in 2021.85
Perhaps the most mystifying target of Chinese sanctions is Jónas Haraldsson,
an Icelandic lawyer critical of China’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic and
Chinese tourists in Iceland.86 As with other targets, Haraldsson was sanctioned
after Iceland placed sanctions on China.
China has long used informal sanctions to cow foreign critics. Scholars who
write about topics that China deems sensitive—Tibet, Taiwan, Tiananmen,
Xinjiang—face difficulty entering China. To take one noteworthy example, China
denied visas to most of the sixteen contributors to the 2004 book, Xinjiang: China’s
Muslim Borderland.87 In a similar vein, Professor Perry Link faced visa denials as
early as 1995.88
What differs about the current sanctions are the openness and transparency
with which they are levied. Previously, China did not openly discuss who was
banned from entering China; scholars were left guessing after their visas were
denied. Under the new regime, China directs its embassies to inform the
sanctioned person of his or her punishment, but not why or how to appeal.
After sanctioning Jónas Haraldsson, the Chinese embassy in Reykjavik
stated, “China has decided to impose reciprocal sanctions on one individual on
the Icelandic side who seriously harms China’s sovereignty and interests by
maliciously spreading lies and disinformation.”89 The statement further demanded
that “Iceland should truly respect China’s sovereignty, security, and development
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See, e.g., Björn Jerdén & Viking Botham, China’s Propaganda Campaign in Sweden, 2018–2019,
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though my search was limited by my inability to read Icelandic.
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interests, and stop interfering in China’s internal affairs under the pretext of
human rights issues.”90
Whether one accepts China’s proffered explanations is, of course, a different
matter. It is difficult to characterize sanctions as “reciprocal” when China targets
a single individual for actions taken by his government; China’s sanctions lack
proportionality and send a chilling message to critics of China. It strains credulity
to suggest Haraldsson’s statements—written in the Icelandic language to a
population of at most 330,000 people)—harmed the sovereignty and national
interests of a powerful state thousands of miles away. Instead, they attempt to
muzzle critics of China, wherever they may roam.

V. CONCLUSION
Professor Ginsburg’s Democracy and International Law provides much food for
thought on the ways that liberal democracies differ from repressive autocracies in
drafting, interpreting, and using international law. In this brief contribution, we
have charted how China took an instrument from the toolkit of liberal
internationalism and repurposed it into a weapon with which to punish its critics.
Western states developed economic sanctions to inflict limited reputational,
financial, and operational damage on state or corporate actors engaging in human
rights abuses or anti-democratic behavior. To be sure, one can criticize the scope,
breadth, and aim of these sanctions, and the extraterritorial effects they bring to
bear on actors far beyond American or European shores. Nevertheless, Western
sanctions do not generally apply to people for beliefs, opinions, or criticisms they
espouse.
China’s sanctions regime, up until the present, remains rudimentary. No
doubt it will expand in scope, complexity, and sophistication in the years to come.
But the past year has already yielded insights into how China will apply sanctions
in the short to medium term. It is telling that China has not publicly sanctioned
any corporations—perhaps to mollify fears from foreign (non-Chinese) investors
about conducting business with a country subject to a widening web of
international sanctions. China has, of course, imposed sanctions on high-level
political actors from Europe and North America, generally in response to
sanctions from those same Western states—a clear instance of mimicry. Where
China is breaking new ground—repurposing the sanctions regime—is in targeting
foreign critics of the People’s Republic. This use of sanctions raises obvious
concerns for academics, experts, and observers, whose careers may depend upon
access to China. But it also shows how China uses law to advance authoritarian
aims: to limit speech, to deflect criticism, and to turn public opinion against those
who dare question China’s actions or motives.
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